Future of Administrative Justice by Sossin, Lorne
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University 
Osgoode Digital Commons 
Articles & Book Chapters Faculty Scholarship 
2008 
Future of Administrative Justice 
Lorne Sossin 
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, lsossin@osgoode.yorku.ca 
Source Publication: 
Canadian Journal of Administrative Law & Practice. Volume 21 (2008), p. 192-222. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative 
Works 4.0 License. 
Recommended Citation 
Sossin, Lorne. “Future of Administrative Justice.” Canadian Journal of Administrative Law & Practice. 21 
(2008): 192-222. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Osgoode Digital Commons. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Articles & Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital 
Commons. 
Future of Administrative Justice 
Symposium Report* 
Administrative Justice Working Group** 
INTRODUCTION 
What is Administrative Justice? At its core, Administrative Jus-
tice refers to the system of decision-making of administrative agencies, 
boards, commissions and tribunals. As Chief Justice McLachlin of the 
Supreme Court of Canada famously observed, "Many more citizens have 
their rights determined by these tribunals than by the courts." (Cooper, 
1996.) In addition to adjudicating rights and resolving disputes involving 
public authority, these administrative bodies also engage in regulatory 
decision-making and ensure that government programs operate fairly and 
in accordance with the law. 
In recent years, there have been several jurisdictions that have 
overhauled their Administrative Justice sectors. Currently, there is a lively 
debate about the scope, nature and status of Administrative Justice in 
Ontario. There are also important developments in peer jurisdictions, 
especially in B.C., Quebec and the United Kingdom, which can and should 
inform the dialogue in Ontario. 
The purpose of the "Future of Administrative Justice" Sympo-
sium, held at the Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, on January 17-
18, 2008, was to bring together a wide range of experts, practitioners and 
observers of administrative justice to explore the dynamics of adminis-
trative justice and possible directions of reform. The Symposium was 
generously supported by the Law Foundation of Ontario, Legal Aid On-
tario and the Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. 
A webcast of the Symposium itself may be found on the Univer-
sity of Toronto, Faculty of Law website. 1 
The Administrative Justice Bibliography (AJB) (discussed below 
in Appendix "A") was launched at the Symposium as an ongoing resource 
for those interested in finding out more about Administrative Justice. 
* January 17 & 18, 2008, University of Toronto, Faculty of Law. Organized by the 
Administrative Justice Working Group. 
** Executive Members: Lorne Sossin, Ron Ellis, Kathy Laird, Ivana Petricone, 
Carol Prest, and Jo-Ann Seamon. With thanks to Evgeny Zbrowski, the Sym-
posium RA who had a hand in drafting the Report. 
1 On Ii ne: http://www. law .utoronto.ca/conferences/admi njustice. html. 
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The Symposium was organized by the Administrative Justice 
Working Group (AJWG), a public interest network of lawyers, partici-
pants in the administrative tribunal sector and academics seeking to ad-
vance administrative justice issues in Ontario. AJWG grew out of an ad 
hoc Ontario legal clinic network called the Government Adjudicative 
Agencies Group (GAAG) that began in 2001 with the goal of improving 
the administrative justice system its most disenfranchised participants, 
low-income Ontarians. Both AJWG and GAAG are informal and unin-
corporated network organizations. 
The Organizing Committee of the Administrative Justice Work-
ing Group for the Symposium consisted of Ron Ellis, Alec Farquhar, 
Kathy Laird, Ivana Petricone, Carole Prest, Jo-Ann Seamon and Lorne 
Sossin. 
The Organizing Committee wishes to thank Jennifer Tam and 
Dylan Reid of the Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, for their assis-
tance in supporting the Symposium, and Evgeny Zborovsky for his assis-
tance in preparing this report. 
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KEYNOTE ADDRESS BY LORD JUSTICE CARNWATH 
Lord Justice Carnwath set the stage for the Symposium by fo-
cusing on the ways in which recent reforms in the U.K. have transformed 
administrative justice, and highlighting key areas of continuing debate 
about the nature of administrative justice and its role within the justice 
system. 
Lord Justice Carnwath emphasized the importance of the recog-
nition of administrative tribunals as an integral part of the justice system 
in the Tribunals, Courts, and Enforcement Act (2007): 
The key message of the new Act is that tribunals are no longer the Cinder-
ellas of the justice system. Tribunal justice is real justice, and a distinctive 
and vital part of the judicial system; and tribunal "judges" (as they will now 
be called - rather than commissioners, panelists, adjudicators or whatever) 
are full members of the independent judiciary. Section I of the Tribunals 
Act underlines the point, by extending to them the statutory guarantee of 
judicial independence. conferred on the court judiciary by the Constitutional 
Reform Act 2005. 2 
2 Lord Justice Camwath, Keynote Address. In response to a question, Lord Justice 
Camwath noted that although the Franks report recognized tribunals as independ-
ent adjudicators, they continued to be administered by the government departments 
whose decision they reviewed and it was not until the recommendations in the 
Leggatt report to create an integrated. independent tribunal system, that the idea 
of independent adjudicators was realized. 
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At the same time, Lord Justice Carnwath noted some continuing 
questions about the place of administrative tribunals in the U.K. justice 
system. 
Applying for Membership in International Association of Su-
preme Administrative Judges (IASAJ), for example, raised the question 
of whether a tribunal exercising appellate jurisdiction in a common law 
nation could be seen as a 'supreme administrative tribunal' if it is still 
subject to further appeal or review by the courts. The answer seems to be 
"Yes", following the example of the Australian Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal (AA T), which has been recognized as a full member of IASAJ 
on the basis that it exercises the highest purely administrative jurisdiction. 
Lord Justice Carnwath also recounted a speech delivered by the 
Vice President of France's Conseil d'Etat, M. Jean-Marc Sauve, which 
highlighted both the similarity and the differences between the direction 
of administrative justice in the U.K. and in France. As with the Upper 
Tribunal in the U.K over which Lord Justice Carnwath will preside as 
Senior President of Tribunals, the Conseil d'Etat has evolved into an 
appellate body that hears cases from a host of administrative tribunals of 
first instance. However, unlike in the U.K., the Conseil d'Etat has main-
tained an advisory role to government, while successfully safeguarding 
its independence through the use of ethical walls and other protections. 
In the U.K., by contrast, the creation of the Supreme Court to take over 
the role of the House of Lords as the highest appellate body was said to 
be necessary to ensure independence. 
Lord Justice Carnwath also explored the categorization of tribu-
nals, and advocated a flexible approach that embraces both disputes be-
tween individuals that are not directly concerned with public administra-
tion (for example, a labour board or landlord and tenant tribunal), and 
administrative disputes between individuals and the state (for example, a 
social benefits tribunal). 
Finally, Lord Justice Carnwath explored the relationship between 
courts, tribunals, mediators and ombudsmen. Here, too, a flexible and 
integrated approach was advocated. While tribunals continue to have a 
unique role to play in delivering expert, flexible and efficient justice, we 
need to take a broad view and ensure that courts, tribunals, mediators and 
ombudsmen are all able to work togetherto address the everyday problems 
of, and effectively communicate with, the ordinary citizens who use the 
justice system. The hope for the future of administrative justice is that 
"we will have a fully integrated administrative justice system, which 
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includes everyone engaged in the business of resolving administrative 
disputes, and there are prayers for all."3 
1. NEW FRONTIERS OF MERIT IN TRIBUNAL APPOINTMENTS 
Judith McCormack (Downtown Legal Services) began the dis-
cussion with an insightful analysis of "What We Talk About When We 
Talk About Merit and Why It Isn't Enough". McCormack argued that we 
need to move from a culture of amateurism to one of professionalism and 
start thinking of adjudicators like other professionals who receive years 
of training, apprenticeship and licensing. 
Merit-based appointments have been defined in reaction to the 
worst government practices associated with patronage appointments, 
where positions are offered to reward constituencies and supporters, and 
the appointment and re-appointment processes are manipulated to attempt 
to influence decision-making. The patronage model was invested in the 
idea that anyone can be an adjudicator, and that all they needed was a 
smattering of experience, a little on-the-job training, and maybe some 
mentorship. This view of adjudicators, of course, flies in the face of the 
idea that tribunals are specialized bodies, with unique expertise in their 
fields, and it presents the most serious impediment to the professionali-
zation of administrative tribunals. 
The discussion of merit has taken place in three arenas: (I) in the 
courts, (2) through governmental initiatives to reform the appointment 
process, and (3) through tribunals' own efforts to design and implement 
training, selection criteria, and performance evaluation. All three, Mc-
Cormack argued, have come short in significant ways. 
The courts are inherently limited because they can only reach 
back to questions of merit through individual party rights. Courts are thus 
unlikely to address what constitutes merit, what is a merit appointment, 
or other fundamental systemic issues. To some extent, they also should 
not do so. Where courts have intervened, the results have not provided 
consistent guidance, and, in some cases, the courts have even sanctioned 
bad government practices. Although the courts do have the advantage of 
being able to tell governments what to do where there is little political 
will for reform, and are familiar with norms of judicial independence, 
courts have been reluctant to apply judicial norms to administrative tri-
bunals, or have attenuated them. McCormack argued that we should give 
·
1 Lord Justice Carnwath, Keynote Address. 
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up on the courts because they are just the wrong place for the discussion 
of merit. 
Government reforms to the appointment process, while highly 
laudable, should be viewed as just the beginning of the discussion of 
merit, not the end. Government initiatives tend to focus on fairness, 
transparency and accessibility. This is obviously commendable because 
it may encourage more qualified people to apply and create a more diverse 
and representative body. But it also has two weaknesses. First, it does not 
necessarily ensure that you have a highly qualified pool of applicants. 
Second, and more importantly, it perpetuates the culture of amateurism, 
the idea that anyone can do these jobs. In moving from a historical context 
of patronage appointment to issues of fairness and openness, we are still 
looking at the adjudicators' jobs as plum positions for which no special 
qualifications are required, but now we are making sure that everyone has 
a fair shot at them. Term appointments are a good example of this: they 
make it difficult for someone to develop professional expertise as an 
adjudicator, but they do make sure that lots of different citizens have a 
turn at the jobs. This is in sharp contrast to other professions, which place 
a premium on developing experience and expertise. 
Similarly, the efforts of tribunals are good as far as they go. 
However, these also still reflect the amateur model of adjudication. For 
example, the excellent training programs created by tribunals and organ-
izations like the Society of Ontario Adjudicators and Regulators (SOAR) 
are designed to take someone from adjudicator kindergarten to graduation 
in a few days. Their focus on basics like "what is a tribunal?" reflects the 
wide acceptance of the idea that no special skills or knowledge are re-
quired to become an adjudicator. 
McCormack suggested that three kinds of skills are required for 
professional adjudicators: ( 1) legal skills in interpreting and applying 
laws, (2) skills in the specialized field of the tribunal, and (3) adjudication 
skills. McCormack emphasized the importance of non-legal expertise and 
adjudication expertise, noting in particular that we need to move away 
from the idea that policy considerations are inherently subjective, and 
recognize that there is objective social science that can be brought to bear 
on the problems being dealt with by tribunals. Finally, McCormack pro-
posed that we address concerns about accessibility and diversity by im-
proving access to the training needed to become a professional adjudi-
cator, and think of the training programs as the point of entry into the 
profession, rather than focusing on the selection and appointment process. 
Dr. Lilian Ma (Landlord and Tenant Board) continued the 
discussion by providing insight into the recruitment and retention issues 
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facing a real-life tribunal, the Landlord and Tenant Board of Ontario 
(LTB). 
Ma described her own appointment as Chair as an example of the 
new process for public appointments in Ontario, and how it provided the 
basis for a positive partnership in which Ma as the Chair and the respon-
sible minister were able "to do great things together". 
L TB is a generalist tribunal, with a highly de-centralized struc-
ture. When Ma began as Chair of LTB in 2005, it was faced with a heavy 
caseload, a high rate of member vacancies, and low morale. The members 
had not received a raise in pay for many years, and were paid less than 
mediators, who were civil servants. There were also not enough regional 
Vice Chairs to make sure that members received appropriate mentoring 
and support. Poaching by other tribunals, which offered better pay for 
less work, was also very common. 
L TB created a Members Human Resources Committee to address 
these concerns, and developed a strategy for recruitment and retention. In 
September 2006, the members' remuneration was increased, and morale 
has improved. The term of appointment has also been changed from six 
to ten years, which encourages greater professionalization. Members now 
have more time to develop skills as adjudicators and then move on to 
other tribunals using the skills they have gained at LTB. 
The continuing problems facing LTB include poaching by other 
tribunals and training. Ma suggested that rather than viewing each tribunal 
as its 'own shop', which competes for qualified appointees against other 
tribunals, a system-wide approach is necessary, in which tribunals would 
work together in recruitment and retention. Similarly, greater cooperation 
with the government is needed to improve training. For example, Ma 
suggested that training programs that are open to civil servants could be 
made also available to tribunal members. 
Michael Gottheil (Ontario Human Rights Tribunal) offered a 
second perspective on the appointment process from a tribunal's point of 
view. Gottheil proposed that the new frontier of merit in tribunal appoint-
ment is the creation of a dynamic and flexible process that is tribunal-
specific and tribunal-driven. 
Until now, merit has stood for a broad notion that the people 
appointed to a tribunal should be qualified and should be selected through 
an open and transparent process. However, the qualifications have tended 
to be externally defined, not internally within the tribunal itself, and the 
design of the appointment process has been done on a one-size-fits-all 
model. 
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The new appointment process will be focused on the specific 
mandate of the tribunal and enable the tribunal to define what qualifica-
tions are needed to fulfill its mandate. The new appointment process will 
also be dynamic and flexible to allow the set of qualifications to change 
over time as the nature of the tribunal's work, the community it serves, 
and society at large changes. 
Gottheil suggested that access to justice concerns in particular 
will be key to how tribunals define merit. Traditionally, when we think 
about merit we really look at the substantive legal area of the tribunal and 
for qualifications in that legal area. More recently, there is an understand-
ing that core competencies also include an ability to adjudicate disputes 
and alternative dispute resolution skills. In the new approach to merit, 
qualifications will be defined more broadly, based on the specific tribu-
nal's work and its users. Tribunals are different from generalist courts 
and from each other; each tribunal is unique. Tribunals serve clients who 
are not usually regular users of the legal system. For them, the tribunal is 
often their one shot at justice. The qualifications required will be defined 
by the needs of these users and the need to enhance access to justice. 
Finally, Gottheil addressed the question of how we can move to 
this new approach to merit. The key, Gottheil argued, is a shift towards a 
recognition of the role of tribunals in defining merit and designing the 
appropriate appointment process, as well as trust by governments in tri-
bunal chairs. The chair of a tribunal should be given the latitude to set 
core competencies and the final selection decision should be based on the 
recommendation of the tribunal chair. 
Debra Roberts (Public Appointments Secretariat, Govern-
ment of Ontario) next described the changes to the appointment process 
put in place by the Liberal Government in Ontario since 2003. 
The basic philosophy underlying the government's approach has 
been to ensure that people appointed are qualified and that they are 
representative of the population of Ontario. 
In November 2003, when Roberts assumed her role, there was a 
backlog in appointments and pressure from tribunal chairs to fill vacan-
cies. 
Roberts was faced with the question of what is merit and who 
determines merit. It became clear that the best way to ensure a meritorious 
and open process was to allow the tribunal chairs to have input into the 
selection process. Chairs are uniquely situated to understand the needs of 
their members. 
The first key change made by PAS was the decision to advertise 
positions. All chair and full-time member positions are advertised. For 
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other positions, advertising will depend on the needs of the tribunal. PAS 
also created a more accessible website to give information on the appoint-
ment process and vacancies. Applications for positions are now web-
based and information on new appointees is posted on the website. PAS 
has become the point of contact for applicants and the start and end of the 
selection process. All resumes come into the PAS office. Paneled inter-
views are conducted for chairs and full-time members. Finally, back-
ground security checks are now performed for all applicants, and appli-
cants are required to provide a declaration of any conflicts of interest they 
may have. 
Overall, these changes have been successful in creating a more 
fair and open process. The new process recognizes the important role of 
tribunal chairs. Advertising has been successful in attracting qualified 
people from both Ontario and abroad. 
The government has also completed reforms in the remuneration 
of tribunal members and term limits. The government recognized that it 
is difficult to attract highly qualified people without adequate compen-
sation, but politically this was a challenging issue. Remuneration of tri-
bunal members is now tied to senior-management pay levels in the civil 
service, and increases in keeping with them. Term limits, where they are 
applicable, have been increased to allow tribunal members to develop 
expertise, and have been tied to remuneration increases to reflect a mem-
ber's growing experience. The current model is as follows: 
• two-year initial term for a new adjudicator; 
• three-year reappointment term (with a raise); 
• five-year reappointment term (with another raise). 
There is a total ten-year limit on appointment to the same position. 
However, when a member is appointed to a new position, such as that of 
a vice-chair, the clock restarts and the term limit for the new position is 
again ten years. This is a further recognition that tribunal members per-
form a professional role. 
Looking into the future, Roberts mentioned the recent clustering 
project led by Kevin Whittaker. This was a pilot exercise to explore how 
tribunals can share resources through cross-appointments, joint websites, 
combined training and so on. It is hoped that this will continue. Finally, 
Roberts also mentioned the importance of working on improving training 
for tribunal members in partnership with organizations such as SOAR. 
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Q&A (moderated by Lorne Sossin, University of Toronto) 
There was a hrief Q&A discussion. Lorne Sossin drew attention 
to the changing nature of appointments to administrative trihunals and 
queried whether, as we move towards greater convergence in our approach 
to appointments across different trihunals, we will increasingly come to 
recognize that there is an administrative justice system and expect that, 
like the justice system, it would fall under the responsihility of a single 
government ministry, rather than the current system of separate fiefdoms, 
in which different trihunals are heing managed hy different line ministries. 
Another question raised was whether it would make sense to 
enshrine the special expertise of the trihunal hy specifying in the legis-
lation the qualifications required of memhers, as has heen done to some 
extent in the legislation for the Ontario Human Rights Trihunal. McCor-
mack found that this may he a good way to estahlish legal and non-legal 
expertise requirements, hut noted that, as Gottheil pointed out, the qual-
ifications required may change. McCormack also pointed out that a tri-
hunal may need different memhers to have different expertise. Gottheil 
agreed that this may he a good idea, hut any legislation would need to 
have a halance hetween specificity and tlexihility. 
2. CURRENT ISSUES IN TRIBUNAL INDEPENDENCE 
David Mullan (Professor Emeritus, Queen's) introduced the 
discussion of independence hy returning to Lilian Ma's statement that she 
was ahle to work with the Minister "to do great things together". One way 
to think ahout issues of independence is to ask to what extent trihunals 
and the government should he ahle to do great things together. 
Mullan noted the recent controversy over the Canadian Nuclear 
Safety Commission's (CNSC) decision to shut down due to safety con-
cerns the Chalk River nuclear facility run hy Atomic Energy of Canada 
Limited AECL (a Federal Crown Corporation), and the suhsequent de-
cision hy Parliament to override the decision of the CNSC hecause it 
produced urgently needed medical isotopes, and the suhsequent govern-
ment decision to dismiss the Chair of the CNSC, Linda Keen. Did CNSC 
and the government cease to he ahle to do great things together? When 
does lack of confidence in the Chair of a trihunal justify his or her 
dismissal? 
Ron Ellis (Osgoode Hall Law School) discussed the issues 
raised hy the McKenzie case ahout constitutional guarantees of independ-
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ence.4 The basic issue at stake in the case according to Ellis is whether, 
in administrative justice, legislative sovereignty trumps the rule of law or 
vice versa. Is judicial independence of rights adjudicators, the cornerstone 
of the rule of law, merely optional? 
Ellis drew on two examples to show the urgency of this question. 
First, Ellis noted the recent change in the adjudication of landlord and 
tenant disputes in British Columbia. Since 2006, landlords in B.C. can 
obtain final eviction notices from government employees in the Ministry 
of Housing. Should governments be able to transfer judicial functions, 
Ellis asked, to governmental employees? Are we comfortable with a 
constitution that allows landlords, including public housing corporations, 
to get final eviction orders by applying to government employees? 
Second, Ellis turned to the change at issue in the McKenzie case 
itself. Since 2003, B.C. has claimed the right to terminate the appointment 
of any adjudicator at any time without cause with one year's pay in lieu 
of notice. Should a legislature be free to make all adjudicators government 
employees? Given that the government hires, decides what adjudicators 
will get paid, and is able to dismiss them without cause, can they be 
viewed as anything other than government employees? 
The courts in the McKenzie case are faced with the question of 
whether, ifthe B.C. legislature in fact intended to authorize the executive 
branch to terminate adjudicative tribunal members without cause, it was 
acting beyond its constitutional powers. At trial, the B.C. Supreme Court 
said yes. 5 At the Court of Appeal, the decision took a beating but survived. 
If the Supreme Court of Canada grants leave and agrees with the B.C. 
Supreme Court, there will be a new chapter in constitutional law.6 Once 
we get past the question of whether a constitutional requirement of judicial 
independence applies to any tribunals at all, and it seems inconceivable 
that it will not eventually be seen to apply to some tribunals, then we will 
have to deal with the questions of what kinds of tribunals it does apply 
to, under what circumstances, and to what effect. The answers to these 
questions have the potential to transform our administrative justice sys-
tem, to "justicize" it. McKenzie has given these questions renewed life. 
• McKenzie v. British Columbia (Minister of Public Safety), 2007 CarswellBC 250 I, 
2007 BCCA 507 (B.C. C.A.). 
5 McKenzie v. British Columbia (Minister of Public Safety), 2006 CarswellBC 2262, 
2006 BCSC 1372 (B.C. S.C.). 
6 McKenzie v. British Columbia (Minister of Public Safety) (April 24, 2008), Doc. 
32398. 2008 CarswellBC 824, 2008 CarswellBC 825 (S.C.C.). 
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Ellis next provided a historical context for the evolution of judi-
cial independence in Canadian law. No one has ever doubted that judicial 
independence was the cornerstone of the rule of law. However, prior to 
the watershed Supreme Court of Canada decision in Valente, provincial 
court judges and administrative tribunal members were regarded as in-
dependent in law, even though they were dependent in fact. 7 For example, 
prior to 1962, all Ontario provincial court judges were appointed at pleas-
ure, and until 1982, judges who served after the age of 65 until the 
mandatory retirement age of 75 were appointed at pleasure. Most adju-
dicative tribunal members were also appointed at pleasure. All of this 
changed in 1985 with Valente. 
Ellis urged that we must not forget how the law used to reconcile 
dependency in fact with independence in law through what he called the 
"hope and a prayer" doctrine, or the trust doctrine. Courts believed that 
honourable men appointed as judges and adjudicators would perform their 
duties diligently and not allow the government's powers to effect their 
decisions. Governments, in turn, were trusted to refrain from abusing their 
powers to interfere with the courts' and tribunals' independence. Absent 
positive evidence of impropriety, the law presumed that judges and ad-
judicators were independent even if they were in fact dependent. 
The revolutionary insight in Valente was that independence must 
be protected through specific provisions of law that provide objective 
structural guarantees of independence. It is essential to realize that this 
change has implicitly and radically altered the nature of the debate about 
the relationship between tribunals and governments, and has raised a new 
constitutional issue: 
In our justice system history, the presumption of independence had always 
finessed the issue of independence. 
Post-Valente, none of that can any longer withstand scrutiny, the presump-
tion is gone, the finesse no longer applies and the issue is now front and 
centre to be faced, addressed, and determined. All of these structural rela-
tionships [between line ministries and 'their' tribunals] must now be seen 
to be, at least arguably, incompatible in law with judicial independence. 
And, suddenly we are faced, really for the first time in our history, with a 
clear question as to whether we, as a society, are prepared to mandate 
legislatures to remove judicial functions from the courts, or to create new 
judicial functions, and assign those functions to institutions and/or individ-
uals who, it is now clear, arc not, in law, judicially independent. 
7 Valente v. R. ( 1985), 1985 CarswellOnt 129, 24 D.L.R. (4th) 161 (S.C.C.). 
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Are we, that is, prepared to agree that in our administrative justice systems 
- systems in which we now acknowledge the bulk of the rights disputes of 
our citizens are decided - the rule of law is merely optional?" 
Laverne Jacobs (University of Windsor) continued the discus-
sion by sharing insights into the tension between expertise and independ-
ence from her empirical research into tribunal culture. Jacobs' research 
picks up where Valente leaves off by examining what conditions, in 
addition to those identified in Valente of security of tenure, financial 
security, and administrative control, are required for independence in an 
expert tribunal. 
Jacobs' research focused on access to information and privacy 
commissions, using a quantitative and empirical approach. Jacobs con-
ducted interviews with tribunal staff and observed the day-to-day work 
at the Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) of Ontario and the 
Quebec Commission d'acces a /'information (CAI). 
Jacobs' research identified a "de facto separation of policy-mak-
ing and adjudicative functions" at the tribunals that was driven by con-
cerns about safeguarding the independence of adjudicators. IPC has a 
multi-functional mandate that includes education of the public, disputes 
regarding access to government information, privacy complaints, and a 
policy function on access and privacy matters. Jacobs noted that a com-
mon discourse at IPC was one of "separate worlds". The expertise devel-
oped by the policy branch was not applied directly in the adjudicative 
function of the tribunal. Adjudicators making decisions were seen as 
"independent" and there was thus a "hands-off' approach, which sepa-
rated the policy-making expertise from the adjudicative function. 
CAI also had a dual mandate at the time of Jacobs' research. 
However, the legislature, motivated by a report submitted by CAI, began 
examining bifurcating the adjudicative and policy functions because of a 
perceived conflict between the two. There was a concern that decision-
makers would form a 'closed mind' because of policy work, such as 
reviewing and providing comments to the government on legislation. 
Although there was a clear understanding that an adjudicator would be 
free to change her mind if she was asked to make a decision concerning 
legislation that the tribunal has previously provided policy guidance on, 
the government ultimately decided in 2006 to bifurcate the tribunal and 
the policy function was transferred to a government ministry. 
The lesson of Jacobs' research is that there may be unexpected 
tensions, both in theory and in actual practice, between expertise and 
" Ellis. The Big Question. 
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independence, and between "expert decision-making" and simple "eve-
ryday justice" for ordinary citizens. It remains to be determined whether 
this tension can be resolved and, if so, whether legislative provisions, 
which delineate different roles and functions within tribunals, or consti-
tutional guarantees of independence, would provide the best theoretical 
resolution and practical guidance to tribunals. 
Audrey Macklin (University of Toronto) made the case for 
greater empirical research of the kind undertaken by Jacobs, and also 
returned to McCormack' s questioning of the role of the courts in defining 
merit, by examining two basic questions about the role of legal rules in 
creating the conditions for independence: 
(I) Are the existing legal rules adequate to ensuring independence? 
(2) Are legal rules per se to some degree inadequate to the task of 
creating independence? 
With respect to the first question, Macklin highlighted key issues 
in independence that have not yet been addressed by legal rules: the 
appointment and re-appointment process. What kinds of legal rules can 
be used to address these problems? One radical possibility that Macklin 
noted is the possibility of a human rights complaint for discrimination on 
the basis of political opinion (or lack thereof), as was brought by one 
tribunal member in Nova Scotia. While this option may seem far-fetched, 
it does provide a striking new way of looking at patronage appointments. 
Macki in also reflected on her experience as a member of the Immigration 
and Refugee Board (IRB), where the political nature of re-appointment 
decisions undermined the authority of the chair and vice-chairs and cor-
roded the internal structure of the IRB. Legal rules are needed to safeguard 
both the external and internal independence of tribunals, but it is also 
important to recognize the need to ensure that the internal management 
of the tribunal is not undermined by external influence. 
One reason for optimism, in Macklin' s view, is that as the judicial 
appointment process and judicial independence are developed in case law 
and in political reforms, there may be more willingness to apply the same 
kind of attention to at least some tribunals. Here an analogy can be drawn 
between the duty to provide reasons: as judges were increasingly required 
to provide written reasons, so were tribunals. 
Macklin then discussed the potential inherent limitations of legal 
rules. Even the best rules can be circumvented where there is lack of 
political will or where the principles underlying the legal rules have not 
been absorbed by the organization's culture. 
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We can imagine circumstances, Macklin argued, where the Val-
ente rules are neither necessary nor sufficient. For example, the Crown 
Attorney's office is a part of the Ministry of the Attorney General, a line 
ministry. But in Ontario, the independence of the Crown Attorney's office 
is fairly well established.9 In Nova Scotia, by contrast, independence at 
the Crown Attorney's office became a serious problem and led to the 
recommendation of creating a separate Director of Public Prosecutions in 
the Marshall Inquiry in 1989. 
What makes the difference? The internalization of the underlying 
principles seems to be particularly important. Legal rules may never get 
to what it takes to create a culture of independence. This suggests that the 
work being done by Jacobs is crucial to a better understanding of inde-
pendence. Macklin urged the importance of studying both structures that 
work and those that don't work. More than legal skills may be needed for 
this task: we should bring sociological and ethnographic research to bear 
on these questions. 
Adam Dodek (Visiting Scholar, Osgoode/Toronto) (commen-
tator) next asked whether, when it comes to independence, it is possible 
to have too much of a good thing. The usual question is: "How do we 
maximize independence?" Dodek suggested that we should focus instead 
on the question: "How do we do great things together?" 
We tend to focus on independence as the opposite of dependence, 
and identify it with self-reliance, autonomy, and ability to fulfill one's 
own mandate. These are the ideal types that animate the discussion of 
independence. 
Independence, however, can also connote lack of connection, Jack 
of relationships, separateness, being cut-off from parts of society, and 
orphaning. Independence can be used in the context of administrative 
justice to orphan a tribunal, to deprive it of a champion, to leave it out in 
the wind. The most common ways governments interfere with tribunals 
is simply by ignoring them, leaving them starved for cash, etc. 
One notable example of this danger arose in Ontario in connection 
with the reforms to the Ontario Human Rights Commission (OHRC). 
There was a perception that OHRC was not independent enough. A pro-
posal was made to make the Commissioner an independent officer of the 
9 [It should be noted here that the division between the dual role of the Attorney 
General as both a cabinet member and Attorney General has not been unproble-
matic in Ontario. and both court decisions and political leadership, most notably 
by the Hon. Roy McMurtry, have helped to entrench the principles of independ-
ence.] 
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Legislature, on the same footing as the privacy commissioner and Om-
budsman. But this was an elevation of form over substance. This could 
have meant that the responsibility for OHRC would be transferred from 
yet another ministry, the Ministry of the Attorney General, to the office 
of the legislature. It would have also meant that the budget would have 
been transferred from MAG to the legislature. This would have been 
detrimental to human rights in Ontario. Human rights need champions, 
and had OHRC become an independent officer of the legislature, these 
champions would have been lost. Independence can sound very good in 
and of itself, and it can be tempting for governments to pursue it at the 
expense of actually creating a stronger system for rights protection. 
The imperative for the future of administrative justice is the 
urgent crisis in the civil justice system, which is no longer affordable to 
most Ontarians. The reality is that the administrative justice system is 
where most people see any sort of justice. Whether administrative justice 
is seen as part of the judicial branch or the executive, it must been seen 
as part of the justice system as a whole, and it must be recognized that 
changes within it can have impact elsewhere. 
Dodek concluded by urging us to think of independence as a 
spectrum, to think of relationships, and as much as possible try to insti-
tutionalize those relationships. Independence alone will not lead to effec-
tive administrative justice and too much independence can be a bad thing. 
Q&A (moderated by David Mullan) 
A Q&A discussion followed the presentations. Mullan noted that 
the whole issue of independence has very different dimensions for tri-
bunals than it does for the courts and warned that excessive demands for 
independence can be counterproductive. The more we demand independ-
ence, the more we may be moving independence in the direction of the 
courts. 
Lord Justice Carnwath noted that there seems to be a much 
broader understanding of administrative justice at work in Canada. He 
understood administrative justice as reviewing decisions of the adminis-
tration, but in Canada it seems administrative justice is a broader concept 
for adjudication outside of the regular court system. 
Jacobs confirmed the broad conception of administrative justice 
in Canada. Review of public administration is more common and prom-
inent in Quebec. Many parts of the administrative justice system in Canada 
are hived-off parts of the courts, such as landlord and tenant dispute 
resolution. 
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A question was asked about whether the broad nature of admin-
istrative justice has major implications for independence. Independence 
from whom? Why can't the government make landlord and tenant deci-
sions? 
Ellis replied that what is at stake is the ability of an adjudicator 
to make decisions that are contrary to government policy in applying the 
statute. The culture of independent thinking, the environment in which 
an adjudicator works that fosters that sense of objective and independent 
thinking, is just not part of the culture of the employee in a ministry. 
Ma noted that "to do great things together", a tribunal chair and 
the Minister can use mechanisms such as memoranda of understanding 
to clarify roles and responsibilities and to institutionalize relationships. 
In practice, the utopia of absolute independence may not exist. However, 
'comfort zones' can be created to preserve the separation of roles, and 
with the right person, this can be made to work. From a structural point 
of view, we have to find a practical way to apply theoretical ideas. The 
most important thing is to make it work for the users of the tribunals. 
Ellis noted that what troubled him is that such arrangements are 
so idiosyncratic and contingent on particular persons and a particular 
political environment. At the moment, we are living in a renaissance 
period in Ontario. But the trouble is what happens when the government 
changes. Without some legal structure in place, you can suddenly wind 
up with dysfunctional, uncaring tribunals. It can all tum on a dime. 
Another question was about the relationship between the culture 
of a tribunal and legal rules, and the extent to which legal rules can develop 
to recognize the relationships and structures in place on the ground. For 
example, in CUPE v. Ontario (Minister of Labour) (2003), courts seem 
to have recognized an independence norm that had developed in Ontario 
with respect to private, interest arbitrators. But there is a tension between 
freezing any culture through legal rules and adapting legal rules to new 
developments. 
Macklin agreed that there is a constant feedback between insti-
tutional culture and legal rules. Legal rules can catch up to the reality on 
the ground or they can kick-in to constrain it. 
The discussion concluded with a question about whether impos-
ing the requirements of the rule of law on all tribunals is too inflexible 
and too much of a good thing. It seems most applicable to adjudicative 
tribunals. In the context of multi-functional tribunals, which combine 
adjudication and regulation, greater partnership is needed between the 
tribunal and the government, and greater flexibility. 
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Ellis stressed that the important thing is to have legal structures 
in place that are true to the rule of law, as is the case now in the United 
Kingdom. You can make practical accommodations within these struc-
tures. The rule of law as laid down in Valente is flexible and has different 
consequences for different institutions. But structures are a must. And 
one of the structures that should be in place is a constitutional safeguard 
of independence for institutions charged with determining people's rights. 
3. NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN TRIBUNAL REFORM 
Justice John Evans (Federal Court of Appeal) began the dis-
cussion of tribunal reform by recalling the many reports and studies that 
have been produced on the subject in Ontario. Margot Priest, in her paper 
on the "Tribunal from Hell", catalogued and summarized many of these 
studies and recommendations. 10 "If words were actions," Justice Evans 
said, "we would have the very best tribunal system in Canada." 
Justice Evans reminded the conference that tribunals in Ontario, 
and in Canada in general, have been leaders in fields such as worker's 
compensation, human rights, pay equity, and immigration and refugee 
determination. There is, however, currently some inertia, a failure of 
political will, and a persistent ambivalence about the place of tribunals. 
There used to be a belief that tribunals, if they were subsumed in the 
justice system, would end up at the bottom of the heap as inferior courts. 
Tribunals were administering controversial social programs, and were at 
the sharp end of the new regulatory and welfare state. Collective labour 
bargaining is but one example of the controversial role of tribunals. The 
view was, therefore, that if tribunals were included in the court system, 
their ability to administer their mandate would be undermined. As a result, 
the tribunals were defined in opposition to the courts. However, saying 
"we're not like courts" only gets you so far. Today, tribunals must face 
the challenge of establishing an identity in the eyes of the courts, the 
government and the public. 
(a) "Lessons from the U.K." 
Lord Justice Carnwath provided a comparative U.K. perspec-
tive on many of the issues that had been raised in preceding conference 
discussions. 
10 M. Priest, "Structure and Accountability of Administrative Agencies" ( 1992) 
Spec. Leet. L.S.U.C. 11. 
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Lord Justice Carnwath began outlining the recent reforms in the 
U.K. by noting that it took more than 50 years to move from the recog-
nition in the Franks Report that tribunals are not merely "appendages of 
the government" and are part of the "machinery of adjudication rather 
than the machinery of administration" to the full-fledged realization of 
these ideas in the recommendations of the Leggatt Report in 2001 and the 
resulting legislative reforms. 11 
When it comes to "doing great things together", the U.K. has had 
to face head-on the difficulties in institutionalizing the relationship be-
tween the executive, the courts, and the tribunals due to the decision to 
abolish the historical role of the Lord Chancellor, who is the head of 
judicial system, the speaker of the House of Lords, and a member of the 
cabinet combined through a convenient fiction in a single person the 
legislative, executive and judicial branches of government. The approach 
has been to develop a "Partnership Model" between the Lord Chief Justice 
and the Secretary of State, and, it is expected, the Senior President of the 
Tribunals and the Secretary of State. There will be an advisory board 
established that will give the judiciary input into the administration of the 
justice system. 
Judicial appointments in the U.K., including appointments to 
tribunals, have been dealt with in the past by the Lord Chancellor, and 
there have not been serious problems with patronage. In 2005, the Con-
stitutional Reform Act set up a new judicial appointments commission 
that is entirely independent. The commission provides advice to the Sec-
retary of State on all judicial appointments, with very limited grounds for 
the Secretary of State to refuse an appointment. 
Remuneration and security of tenure have also been fairly good 
in the U.K. system. There are no time-limited appointments and tribunal 
judges can be removed for cause. Recommendations with respect to re-
muneration are made by the Review Body on Senior Salaries. Tribunal 
judges' pay is related to that of court judges. The system is seen to be fair 
and there is general satisfaction. The Secretary of State has recently agreed 
to extend statutory protections against reductions in salary to tribunal 
judges. 
Lord Justice Carnwath emphasized that in his view the key start-
ing point is to decide what the role of tribunals and tribunal members is. 
II Tribunals for Users: One System, One Service: Report of the Review of Tribunals 
by Sir Andrew Leggatt (March 2001), online: http://www.tribunals-re-
view.org.uk/leggatthtm/leg-OO.htm (accessed May 5, 2008). 
212 CON. JOURNAL OF ADMIN. LAW & PRACTICE [21 CJ.A.LP.] 
The rest will fall into place. In the U.K., it's clear that it is to administer 
justice. 
(b) "Lessons from Quebec" 
France Houle (University of Montreal) discussed three key 
reforms created by the 1996 Act respecting administrative justice in Que-
bec: the founding of the Conseil de la justice administrative (CJA), the 
creation of two sets of procedural guidelines for administrative and ad-
judicative tribunals, and the establishment of the Administrative Tribunal 
of Quebec (T AQ). 
CJA has a dual role: it deals with complaints against administra-
tive judges for breach of the Code of Ethics, and it provides recommen-
dations for procedural improvements to the government. 
The two sets of procedural guidelines for administrative and 
adjudicative tribunals reflect a distinction drawn between adjudication 
and public administration in Quebec, and were an important part of the 
reforms. 
The creation of the T AQ followed three major reports by working 
groups in Quebec led by Professor Dussault ( 197 l ), Professor Ouellette 
( 1987), and Professor Garant ( 1994 ). While Dussault began with the idea 
of creating a new administrative court, the current model and organization 
of the T AQ follows the recommendations of Ouellete and Garant. Ouel-
lette proposed the creation of new administrative tribunals, rather than 
courts, in order to maintain simplicity, flexibility, expertise, and other 
unique qualities of administrative tribunals. He proposed four adminis-
trative appeal tribunals. Garant's recommendations built on this by pro-
posing to create a single tribunal with four divisions based on the Ouellette 
proposals. 
The four divisions of T AQ are: 
1. Social Affairs division - social benefits and indemnities (9,200 
annual decisions; 57 full-time members and 26 part-time mem-
bers); 
2. Immovable Property division - municipal taxation ( 1,200 annual 
decisions, 21 members); 
3. Territory and Environment - land issues (200 decisions, 3 mem-
bers); and 
4. Economic Affairs - permits and licenses ( 100 decisions, 4 mem-
bers). 
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T AQ is a purely adjudicative tribunal. Any fields concerned with 
policy-making have been left out, including labour relations, worker's 
compensation, regulatory boards and landlord and tenant disputes (the 
Regic du logement has a limited policy function in determining the allow-
able annual rent increase). 
The Minister of Justice is responsible for T AQ, it is part of the 
justice system, but is not necessarily seen as part of the judiciary. The 
move to the Ministry of Justice was seen as very important for ensuring 
the independence of T AQ members. 
The appointment of T AQ members has evolved since its incep-
tion. Initially, in 1996, members were appointed for a five-year term. In 
2005, the government successfully passed a legislative amendment to 
create tenured appointments for T AQ members. T AQ members are now 
appointed during good behaviour. This was a somewhat unexpected 
change, especially because the five-year term was found to be constitu-
tionally acceptable in the Barreau de Montreal decision. The reasons 
behind the change are unclear. It may reflect the close connection between 
the bar and notaries and the current Liberal government in Quebec. 
As part of the trade-off for the creation of tenured appointments, 
T AQ members and the President of T AQ agreed to undergo and admin-
ister performance reviews for members. T AQ has formed a committee 
and began a pilot project in 2006 in partnership with the Ecole nationale 
d'administration publique (ENAP). The performance review process is 
confidential: the members' identities are concealed with file numbers and 
only the President of T AQ is able to match up members with the file 
numbers. The evaluations are performed by sending out surveys to parties, 
lawyers and colleagues based on numbers that are statistically valid. A 
preliminary report was made public in March 2007, which was largely 
positive. A telephone survey was also done with unrepresented parties 
who had appeared before T AQ, again with positive feedback. In the next 
stage of the project, ENAP will send individual reports on each member 
to the President. 
Houle reflected on the fact that T AQ is slowly becoming more 
and more like a court of justice. Although it was intended to maintain its 
flexibility and specialization as a tribunal, today it is increasingly con-
trolled by lawyers and notaries. T AQ is thus moving back towards the 
initial model of an administrative court that was proposed by Dussault. 
This development raises the question of how we want to structure public 
administration. Do we want tribunals to be part of the justice system and 
judiciary? If so, then they will become like courts, and this may attenuate 
the goals of flexibility, specialization and efficiency. Houle underlined 
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the need to create a link between government and tribunals, while also 
maintaining an appropriate separation between them. These issues had 
been raised in preceding discussions by Dodek and Jacobs. Houle sug-
gested that we may want to look to the French model, in which there is a 
separate administrative branch, which allows for both a link and a sepa-
ration between government and administrative tribunals. 
(c) "Lessons from B.C." 
Philip Bryden (University of New Brunswick) next discussed 
the conditions and strategies that made possible the Administrative Justice 
Project (AJP) in B.C., which began in 2001 and culminated in the intro-
duction of the Administrative Tribunals Act in 2004. 
Bryden identified three key factors: 
(1) factors peculiar to B.C. political environment; 
(2) evolution of thinking about tribunal reform; and 
(3) particular aspects of the way the AJP was set up that allowed it 
to be successful. 
Bryden focused on the last two factors in his discussion. The 
thinking about tribunal independence had evolved in B.C. to the view that 
independence was not just a justice requirement. Rather, independence 
was seen as part of the conditions necessary to enable tribunals to fulfill 
their mandate. This connection between independence and effective ad-
ministration helped to overcome a serious practical and political challenge 
of convincing a wide range of different ministries to participate in tribunal 
reform. Together with Attorney General leadership, this approach was 
successful. 
Another effective part of the approach to reform by the AJP was 
to give serious thought to the role of specific tribunals and re-examine 
whether it would be more effective to accomplish the underlying goals 
through a tribunal, a court or some other structure. For example, the 
Expropriation Compensation Board was abolished and its jurisdiction 
was returned to the courts because it was recognized that the tribunal 
applied general legal principles. 
If it was decided that a tribunal would remain in place, the AJP 
also re-examined what kind of powers and support the tribunal would 
need to fulfill its mandate. This led to consideration of how to create an 
effective appointment system, ensure independence, create a principled 
approach to remuneration, and set out the powers and procedures of the 
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tribunal. Finally, the relationship between the government host ministry, 
the tribunal and the courts was given systematic consideration, and as a 
result attention was given to right of appeal or judicial review and Charter 
jurisdiction. 
The solutions used in the reforms in B.C. were a mix oflegislative 
changes and more informal changes. Not all issues, such as re-appoint-
ment, could he addressed in sufficient depth because of pragmatic political 
considerations. 
Whether or not we agree with all of the answers at which the 
reform program arrived in B.C., the key point is that these issues were 
considered in a systematic manner. 
(d) "The Situation in Ontario" 
Ivana Petricone (ARCH) reflected on the current situation in 
Ontario and the impetus for reforms here. 
One of the current strengths of administrative justice system is 
the strong legal aid system for administrative tribunal users. Community 
legal clinics like ARCH and Downtown Legal Services provide represen-
tation to people of low income who often appear before administrative 
tribunals. 
Part of the mandate of community legal clinics is law reform 
advocacy on behalf of their clients. The Government Agencies Appoint-
ments Group (GAAG) was created to press for administrative justice 
reform in Ontario because of the increasing problems in administrative 
tribunals during the previous government. Some progress has been made: 
• Preliminary steps by the government in merit-based process; 
• Government has acknowledged that tribunal adjudicators are pro-
fessionals (remuneration, appointment terms, greater resources 
created for tribunals); 
• Clustering is heing studied, and while it is controversial, it may 
be useful in terms of improving accessibility; 
• Legislative provisions in Human Rights Code statutorily imbed a 
merit-hased appointment process. 
The agenda for future reform would include: 
• Legislative scheme for all tribunal appointments (a parallel pro-
cess could be created for tribunals to the one already in place for 
judicial appointments). 
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• Independence continues to he a problem. For example, the social 
benefits tribunal makes decisions that affect the ministry, and 
government officials from the ministry appear as opposing parties 
in the cases, hut the ministry is also responsible for the adminis-
tration the tribunal. Tribunals, and the disadvantaged groups who 
rely on them, need champions. 
• Improving access to legal counsel, to forms, to websites, to inter-
pretation services. 
• Expansion of duty counsel services and advice lawyer services. 
• More academic research in the area. 
Cristie Ford (UBC) (commentator) summarized and offered 
comments on three dominant themes in the discussion: systematizing 
learning, independence, and access to justice. 
Systematizing learning within the administrative justice system 
is a key part of the reform challenge. The common wealth system, as Lord 
Justice Carnwath pointed out, is hottom-up; hut some reforms have had 
a top-down component. The challenge is to understand how a more sys-
tematic top-down reform agenda can glean and incorporate the knowledge 
on the ground in tribunals. The performance review project at T AQ may 
he instructive. 
The next theme has heen independence. Ford has suggested that 
we need to think of independence together with accountability. In Canada, 
we tend to focus more on safeguarding the structural independence of 
tribunals from ministries and the executive. In the U.S., however, there 
has been a converse concern ahout the accountability of administrative 
agencies. Rather than orphans, the agencies are seen as unaccountable, 
renegade cowboys. The Administrative Procedures Act has attempted to 
reign in the agencies through notice and comment rule-making and allow 
for greater public participation and transparency. In Canada, we only have 
notice and comment rule-making in securities commissions and some 
limited duty to consult is recognized in other contexts. Should we have a 
statutory duty to consult? Do we want more accountability? 
The reforms in the U.K. and Canada do not currently imagine 
greater input from citizens. 
Finally, on access to justice, both the reforms in B.C. and the 
U.K. to the administrative justice system have heen part of wider reforms 
to the justice system as a whole. In many ways, tribunals in B.C. are heing 
pushed hy government to the forefront of the justice system, as the gov-
ernment tries to reframe access-to-justice as access-to-dispute-resolution. 
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Planned reforms to the civil justice system in B.C. include the creation of 
information hubs for users of the justice system, mandatory case confer-
ences, and new procedural rules. These reforms will have enormous im-
plications for administrative justice as well. Administrative justice is now 
expected to he out in front of the courts in resolving disputes effectively 
and efficiently. 
One interesting new development in the B.C. reforms has been 
to limit the jurisdiction of tribunals to interpret and apply the Human 
Rights Code. The Administrative Tribunals Act already restricts tribunals' 
jurisdiction to interpret and apply the Charter: only the Jabour relations 
and securities tribunals have full Charter jurisdiction, including the power 
to invalidate portions of their own legislation for being in breach of the 
Charter. The new amendments impose similar limitations for the Human 
Rights Code. The idea is to streamline the system: Charter issues go 
straight to the courts (not tribunals), and human rights issues go straight 
to the human rights tribunal (not other tribunals). These reforms were 
implemented hy a politically conservative government and this has shaped 
the way they have been seen. Critics of the reforms say that they take the 
Charter and the Human Rights Code out of the "peoples' courts" (i.e., 
the administrative tribunals) and treat them as Holy Grail. In support of 
the reforms, it can be argued that they reduce costs associated with mul-
tiple levels of review; ensure that human rights and Charter questions are 
adjudicated by those with expertise in the area; and arguably that they 
take the Charter and human rights legislation more seriously as a result. 
Interestingly, Ford noted, although there was a Jot of concern by 
poverty Jaw advocates and equality-seeking groups around the changes 
to Charter jurisdiction in 2004, there has not been the same strong op-
position to the more recent human rights reforms. Possible reasons for 
this are that lawyers and poverty advocates found that they prefer having 
Charter and human rights issues decided by expert decision-makers; that 
there have been improvements to tribunals in terms of accessibility and 
fairness. hence alleviating the need to resort to challenges based on the 
Charter and the Human Rights Code; that direct applications to court 
have turned out to be an easier route; and/or that poverty advocates and 
equality-seeking groups are focused on access to counsel as the most 
pressing problem they face. 
Q&A (moderated by Justice John Evans, Federal Court of Appeal) 
The first question was from Michael Gottheil, who asked about 
the procedures in place for negotiating and setting budgets for tribunals. 
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The budget can exert significant pressure on the tribunal and its Chair 
and affect independence of the tribunal. Lord Justice Camwath replied 
that in the U.K., this is still being worked out through the "Partnership 
Model". It is hoped that the advisory board will alleviate the pressure in 
negotiations and provide greater input for courts and tribunals. 
Houle stated that in Quebec, the legislation specifies where 
money for T AQ comes from, although not how much. However, the 
budget has been stable and has even increased. 
Bryden said that in B.C., two things have been done to address 
budgetary issues. First, the number of people involved in the negotiations 
has been reduced due to the rationalization of the system and it has been 
clarified that trade-offs cannot he made between budgetary allowances 
and certain kinds of decisions being reached by tribunals. Second, there 
has been a memoranda of understanding project to provide greater struc-
ture to the negotiation process. 
Ellis commented on the importance of change in the U.K. in 
which the tribunals' administrative services have been joined and taken 
away from the other ministries. Social benefits tribunals in B.C. and 
Ontario, hy contrast, continue to operate under the host ministry, which 
makes all appointment decisions, sets the budget, etc., but also has a direct 
interest in the result of the cases before the tribunal. 
5. ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION ON NEXT STEPS FOR REFORMS 
IN ONTARIO 
Kathy Laird (Ontario Human Rights Tribunal) began the 
discussion by asking whether we have the right ingredients for reform in 
Ontario. 
The first comment was from Raj Anand, who noted that access 
to justice underlies the debates about reforms. The ultimate issue is what 
does any given reform do for the citizen who needs to use these tribunals? 
For example, how can it he satisfactory to move human rights jurisdiction 
to one tribunal, if that tribunal doesn't have resources, or leave human 
rights complainants to their own devices by scaling back the role of the 
human rights commission in bringing forward complaints, as was done 
hy Bill I 07 in Ontario? 
Ford commented that in B.C., the human rights tribunal does 
have, relatively, fairly good resources. The government would argue that 
lawyers give issues of jurisdiction more importance than clients, who just 
want an effective resolution. 
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Mary McKenzie provided an update on the McKenzie case. She 
wass able to speak about the case now as it has evolved into public interest 
litigation in which her own personal interests are no longer engaged. She 
confirmed that the government did not appeal the B.C. Court of Appeal 
decision, which declined to address the substance of the appeal on the 
basis of mootness, but went on to declare the lower Court's decision on 
the statutory interpretation and constitutional issues to be "unnecessary 
obiter dictum" of "no precedential value". Ms. McKenzie and the legal 
team of S.R. Ellis, Q.C., Frank Falzon, Q.C., and Barbara Mcisaac, Q.C., 
have filed an application for leave to the S.C.C. Ms. McKenzie empha-
sized that while we commonly refer to independence, the McKenzie case 
is ultimately about ensuring that there are basic structural safeguards for 
the impartiality that Canadians expect of quasi-judicial tribunals. She 
added that the B.C. government's explicit assertion, in the McKenzie case, 
of a statutory power to dismiss any and all tribunal adjudicators mid-term 
and without cause, if upheld, effectively transforms the status of "term" 
appointments to appointments at pleasure. She pointed out that in the 
recent decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Pelletier, 12 the Court 
stated that a government's decision to terminate an at-pleasure appoint-
ment is nothing more nor Jess than a political decision. She queried how, 
under those circumstances, quasi-judicial adjudicators who serve at pleas-
ure can command public confidence in their impartiality. 
The next question came from Patricia Hughes, who returned to 
the question of whether an administrative tribunal is a generic animal or 
whether we should think more about how tribunals differ in function? In 
the U.K., the tribunals are treated the same, while in Quebec a distinction 
is drawn between adjudicative and regulatory or policy-making tribunals. 
In some discussions, we seem to be glossing over that issue and it does 
seem like a threshold issue. Do we want the same kinds of protections 
and structures by treating all tribunals the same way? Are we going to 
Jose something of accessibility, flexibility and expertise? 
Sossin replied that we may actually focus too much on trying to 
describe the animal that is a tribunal. It's really the rule of Jaw to the 
people who come before bodies that matters. It's the litigants' rights that 
arc at stake. We need to start from the basic idea that when important 
rights are at stake, a range of rule of Jaw requirements is engaged. Gov-
ernments can have flexibility in devising different structures, but they 
can't contract out of rule of Jaw protections. The big mistake is to start 
12 Pelletier v. Canada (Attorney General), 2007 CarswellNat I, 2007 CarswellNat 
2. 2007 FCA 6 (F.C.A.). 
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with the question "Does judicial independence as articulated in Valente 
apply?" Rather we should focus on "What rule of law protections apply 
when anyone comes before a decision-maker?" 
Lord Justice Camwath noted that it was not an easy process in 
the U.K. to figure out what tribunals arc in and what tribunals arc out. 
The Leggatt report focused on a core set of tribunals. Now, in creating 
the chamber structure, there has been remarkable agreement around what 
the structure should he. 
Bryden pointed out there is often little relationship between what 
we do on the ground and the theory. For example, professional discipline 
bodies adjudicate important rights, hut the members are elected decision-
makers. In Suresh," the Supreme Court held that the Minister of Citizen-
ship and Immigration must apply section 7 of Charter protections in 
performing risk assessments for deportees. To say Jet's figure out what 
the rights are and let the structure flow from it, may have little relationship 
to what's on the ground. 
Laird stated that the AJWG's approach has been to focus on 
rights-tribunals that make really important decisions in people's lives. 
There was support voiced from the audience for this approach. It was felt 
that we should focus on a core group of tribunals that deliver justice and 
make important decisions in people's lives. Complications around who's 
in, who's out, and what the framework is, can he resolved once we make 
the leap to recognizing that a core of administrative justice is part of the 
justice system. A sense of urgency to push ahead with the reform agenda 
in Ontario was also expressed, especially because many people feel that 
the current conditions are pretty good and inertia is setting in. We need 
to move beyond "satisfaction". 
Mullan, however, advocated thinking about different categories 
of tribunals and attempting to create a rational structure hy building on 
past work, such as the Ratushny report. 14 
Don Chaisson offered an international perspective on judicial 
independence. In many countries with a burgeoning justice system, the 
debate we are faced with in Ontario would seem very subtle. The answer 
for these nations is the more robust approach of creating a separate and 
independent court system that's also seen to he independent. The forum 
comes first and then the rest of the structure and culture fall into place. 
" Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2002 CarswellNat 7, 
2002 CarswellNat 8, 2002 SCC I (S.C.C.). 
14 E. Ratushny, The Independence of Federal Administrative Tribunals and Agen-
cies (CBA: 1990). 
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Another approach suggested was to focus on the adjudicative 
function of tribunals and thus create reforms for a more broad range of 
tribunals, including those that also have a regulatory function. 
Ellis said that the difficulty with this approach is that it's difficult 
to accomplish this within a reasonable horizon. It is more realistic to start 
with purely adjudicative tribunals, the straightforward cases, and deal 
with them. 
Lord Justice Carnwath said that this was, in effect, the process in 
the U.K. and that Ellis' approach sounds quite sensible. 
The Symposium concluded with an agreement to continue sharing 
ideas and proposals reform, and the need to create greater understanding 
and recognition of the importance of Administrative Justice. 
APPENDIX "A" 
Administrative Justice Bibliography 
Introduction 
The Administrative Justice Bibliography (AJB) is intended to 
serve as an online, categorized and annotated bibliography of articles, 
chapters of books, text and treatise sections, reports, press clippings, 
theses, conference presentations, jurisprudence and other materials, se-
lected by the editors as being of special potential interest to scholars, 
advocates and administrators working in the field of administrative justice 
tribunal design and reform. 
The AJB's mission is to be a central and permanent collection of 
Administrative Justice materials that are often otherwise found in dispa-
rate, and sometimes research-obscure and/or transitory places. Main-
stream, administrative law materials that are readily available elsewhere 
will not, for the most part, be found here. 
The AJB is a project of the Administrative Justice Working 
Group, an ad hoc assemblage of Ontario administrative-justice profes-
sionals who have come together in an effort to contribute their collective 
experience to optimizing the fairness, independence, impartiality, com-
petence and efficiency of the administrative justice system and its tribu-
nals through non-partisan advocacy on behalf of that system. The Group's 
members are current or past administrative-justice practitioners who bring 
to the work of the Group an independent perspective together with sub-
stantial experience in the design of tribunal structures, in the academic 
analyses of administrative justice issues, in the leadership, management 
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and administration of tribunals, and in advocacy before a variety of such 
tribunals. 
The AJB does not purport to he an exhaustive collection of ad-
ministrative justice materials. It is permanently a work in progress and 
consists only of materials that come to the attention of the editors and are 
deemed by them to be of special interest. The collection is unabashedly 
biased towards the Administrative Justice Working Group's reform goals. 
The AJB was launched at the Administrative Justice Working 
Group's Symposium, The Future of Administrative Law, held at the Fac-
ulty of Law, University of Toronto on January 17-18, 2008. 
The AJB can he accessed online. 1 ~ Comments, feedback and 
additional suggestions for sources to include are most welcome! 
'' http://www.law.utoronto.ca/programs/ajb.htm. 
